Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 65
Number 4 Tradeoffs: Technology, Privacy, and
the Law (Summer 2021)

Article 4

2021

The Real Problem with Katz Circularity
Raff Donelson
Penn State Dickinson Law, raff.donelson@psu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Raff Donelson, The Real Problem with Katz Circularity, 65 St. Louis U. L.J. (2021).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol65/iss4/4

This Childress Lecture is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE REAL PROBLEM WITH KATZ CIRCULARITY
RAFF DONELSON*
ABSTRACT
The Fourth Amendment protects people against “unreasonable searches”
by police. To operationalize this protection, courts must have a workable
definition of a search. Since 1967, the Supreme Court has used the two-step Katz
test as a primary measure of when a search has occurred. Under Katz, a court
will find that something has been subject to search when (1) the individual in
question has a subjective expectation of privacy in that thing and (2) such an
expectation of privacy would be reasonable. From early on, commentators have
decried the Katz test as circular and have urged courts to adopt something else.
This essay explains what the circularity worry really amounts to: the worry is
about courts using improperly reduced expectations of privacy as a reason to
withhold Fourth Amendment protection. This worry is much broader than most
commentators have seen, and this broader framing allows one to deflect recent
concerns that Katz circularity (more narrowly construed) is a myth. With the
‘circularity’ worry properly understood, the essay offers a way to deal with it:
courts could simply drop Step One of Katz.

* Associate Professor, Penn State Dickinson Law. I thank the organizers of the 2020 Childress
Symposium at the Saint Louis University School of Law for inviting me to take part. I thank Chad
Flanders for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay. I also thank Madelyn Snyder
for excellent research assistance.
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Katz v. United States 1 is one of the preeminent cases in Fourth Amendment
law. Katz famously offers a test for determining whether some government
action counts as a search and thus is subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. In
hornbooks and casebooks, in courtrooms and classrooms, Katz is said to be a
two-step test. 2 According to that test, conduct counts as a search only if (1) the
conduct infringes upon a person’s subjective expectation of privacy and (2)
expectations of privacy in the given situation would be reasonable.
Scholars and courts have raised worries about the first step. For some critics,
a key problem is that Step One acts as a third wheel: in actual cases, this step is
always found to have been satisfied, 3 so talking about suspects’ subjective
expectations is always “irrelevant” 4 or “meaningless.” 5 This third wheel concern
is thought pedestrian compared to the sexier problem of circularity. 6
The circularity concern is a beautiful example of legal scholars speaking
elliptically. As explained below, the circularity concern is best understood as a
worry about individuals’ subjective expectations of privacy being improperly
reduced. Subjective expectations can, in principle, be improperly reduced by
courts 7 or by the political branches of government. 8 When those possibilities are
entertained, the term circularity often crops up. This is the narrow, traditional
circularity worry. Of course, government is not the only actor who might reduce
our expectations of privacy. Subjective expectations of privacy can also be
improperly reduced by private actors who surveil us, like spying employers 9 and
tech companies who track us on and off the web. 10 As demonstrated below,
subjective expectations of privacy can be improperly reduced by still other
things like mental illness, gullibility, dislocation, and youth. 11 Indeed, the range
of improper influences is potentially wide, so wide that it might seem like there
should be a Step Zero of Katz. This Step Zero would determine whether a
suspect’s subjective expectations were formed under bad conditions.
Instead of introducing a Katz Step Zero, this essay actually advocates for
eliminating Step One, leaving only Step Two. Step One of Katz—asking
1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. In talking of the Katz test, I refer to Justice Harlan’s concurrence, which is the controlling
precedent, not the opinion from the majority. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1979).
3. Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 113, 122 (2015).
4. Id.; Amitai Etzioni, Eight Nails in Katz’s Coffin, 65 CASE W. L. REV. 413, 421 (2014).
5. Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to
Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L. J. 1303, 1312–13 (2002).
6. Id. (stating meaninglessness is less important than circularity).
7. Etzioni, supra note 4, at 413 (“individual . . . expectations of privacy depend on judicial
rulings”).
8. Simmons, supra note 5, at 1313.
9. Etzioni, supra note 4, at 417.
10. Id. at 416.
11. See infra Part III.
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whether a suspect expects privacy—tracks something important only when
combined with what I have called Step Zero. Katz Step Zero asks if the suspect’s
expectations formed under the appropriate conditions. However, that two-part
inquiry can actually just be folded into, or reduced to, Step Two—asking
whether expecting privacy in a given situation would be reasonable. I will even
show that textbook cases in which Step One seems to track something important
all on its own can be reduced to Step Two.
Even the shortest essays can often benefit from a roadmap. This essay
begins, in Part I, by defining Katz circularity and explaining that it is
traditionally understood as a problem with government improperly reducing
suspects’ subjective expectations of privacy. Part II offers some reasons to think
that this concern is not so concerning. If those reasons convince, one might be
led to think that Katz circularity is a nonproblem and that Step One of Katz can
be saved. Part III disabuses the reader of those two thoughts. Granting that the
arguments from Part II succeed, Part III offers new reasons to worry about
improperly reduced expectations of privacy. Part IV explains why the best
solution to these new problems—as well as the old problem—is jettisoning Step
One of Katz and just relying on Step Two. Finally, in Part V, I conclude.
The upshot of this essay is a new and simple test for determining whether
government conduct is a Fourth Amendment search. In short, government
conduct is a search any time government uncovers that over which it would be
reasonable to expect privacy.
I. DEFINING KATZ CIRCULARITY
In this Part, I define “Katz circularity,” or at least the variety of it at issue in
this essay. In the course of defining the concept, I investigate what most
commentators traditionally find troubling about this phenomenon. As I explain,
no one is concerned with circularity per se.
The term “Katz circularity” is tossed about often. 12 It names at least three
different concepts. First, Katz is said to be circular because the test calls on
courts to determine an individual’s subjective expectations of privacy to figure
out whether to scrutinize government behavior, but it turns out that government
behavior might influence the individual’s subjective expectations of privacy.

12. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court,
1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 188 (1979); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal
Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1137,
1195 (1987); Richard A. Epstein, A Common Lawyer Looks at Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.
U. L. REV. 699, 715 (1992); Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV.
1, 60–61 (2001); Jim Harper, Reforming Fourth Amendment Privacy Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L. REV.
1381, 1392 (2008); Christine S. Scott-Hayward et al., Does Privacy Require Secrecy? Societal
Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age?, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19, 25–26 (2015).
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Call this individual attitudinal circularity. 13 The circle here is that expectations
are influenced by the very thing that they are supposed to govern.
When government affects expectations, it may well do so in an improper
way. As one scholar imagines, “[s]uppose the President announces that all
telephone conversations will henceforth be monitored.” 14 In this hypothetical,
an individual suspect would, in turn, no longer expect privacy in her phone calls.
If this happened, government could listen in on those calls, and such conduct
would not be a Fourth Amendment search at all and would get no oversight from
the courts. This type of circularity is the primary focus of this essay, but it is
important to distinguish two other forms.
Katz is also said to be circular because of one way to operationalize Step
Two. Step Two of Katz calls on courts to determine “what society is prepared to
regard as reasonable.” 15 There are many ways to construe this idea. 16 On one
construal, Step Two asks courts to make a sociological judgment about what
most people in American society would expect to be private. 17 Accordingly,
those society-wide beliefs might be influenced by government behavior, just as
with the individual case. Call this societal attitudinal circularity.
Finally, Katz is sometimes called circular or tautological because of a
different way of operationalizing Step Two. Instead of making Step Two a
sociological inquiry, one could understand that step as calling for a court to
provide its own unfettered normative judgment about what is reasonable. 18 If
one does that, something like a circle emerges. On this normative construal of
Step Two, it is reasonable to expect privacy if and only if the court finds it
reasonable to have expected privacy. Tests like that appear to offer no
independent purchase on what would satisfy the standard. 19 Call this doctrinal
circularity. 20

13. Though the distinction appears in many places, Kahn-Fogel provides an especially clear
distinction between attitudinal and doctrinal circularity. Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, Katz, Carpenter,
and Classical Conservatism, 29 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 104 (2019). The foregoing
discussion borrows from that analysis and adds to it by further distinguishing individual and societal
versions of attitudinal circularity.
14. Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 106 (2008).
15. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“. . . there is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
16. See Orin Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504–
05 (2007).
17. Jim Harper, The Fourth Amendment and Data: Put Privacy Policies in the Trial Record,
43 CHAMPION 32, 33 (July 2019).
18. Kerr calls this “the policy model” of Fourth Amendment protection. Kerr, supra note 16,
at 519.
19. Judge Posner, among others, have lodged this complaint. Posner, supra note 12, at 188.
20. Here again, I follow Kahn-Fogel, supra note 13.
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With these nomenclature issues resolved, let us return to our subject—
government influencing someone’s subjective expectations of privacy—what I
have called individual attitudinal circularity. Individual attitudinal circularity
(henceforth Katz circularity) is not problematic by itself. Trouble comes when
government acts in ways that reduce an individual’s subjective expectations of
privacy. Nearly all cases in the literature about Katz circularity feature
government announcing or enacting totalitarian plans, ensuring that nobody
believes they have a moment of respite from surveillance. 21 If the extensive
writing on Katz is any guide, it seems that nobody worries about government
acting in ways that increase individuals’ subjective expectations of privacy.
What is more, not all reductions in subjective expectations are troubling.
Miranda warnings are designed to reduce individuals’ subjective expectations
of privacy: people are told not to expect their utterances to police to remain
private, that these could be used against them. 22 All of this reveals that the
traditional concern of Katz circularity is a concern about government improperly
reducing an individual’s subjective expectations of privacy.
II. NOT SO TROUBLING AFTER ALL?
Having established that the traditional worry about Katz circularity is really
a fear that government will improperly reduce individuals’ subjective
expectations, this part will offer—though not endorse—two reasons why Katz
circularity is less troubling than some have assumed. First, recent empirical work
claims that Katz circularity does not exist. Second, even if it does exist, courts
have adequate tools to deal with it.
Professors Kugler and Strahilevitz have recently authored a groundbreaking
empirical paper, arguing that Katz circularity does not exist. 23 They do so by
looking at popular responses to Riley v. California, a 2014 cell phone search
incident to arrest case. 24 Specifically, the authors asked respondents questions
about what the Constitution allows and what arrestees would reasonably expect
police to do. 25 The respondents were questioned in four waves: one group two
21. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (imagining a world where “the
Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would
be subject to warrantless entry”); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1973–1974) (imagining that “the government could diminish each
person’s subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing halfhourly on television that 1984
was being advanced by a decade and that we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive
electronic surveillance”); Rubenfeld, supra note 14, at 106 (“Suppos[ing] the President announces
that all telephone conversations will henceforth be monitored”).
22. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
23. Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment Circularity,
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1747 (2017).
24. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 378 (2014).
25. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 23, at 1777.
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weeks before the opinion was handed down, another group two weeks after the
opinion came down, yet another group one year after the decision, and a final
group two years post-decision. 26 What the authors found is that there was some
small effect of the decision on attitudes shortly after the opinion, if the
respondent had heard of the case, but this faded after a year. 27 In layfolk’s terms:
Supreme Court decisions do not move people’s expectations of privacy long
term. 28
It is important not to over-read the result. This is just one study. Moreover,
the decision in question did not further restrict privacy rights. Sure, the Katz
circularity crowd generally predicts that government action will shift
expectations of privacy, but the prediction could be modified to claim that a
circularity effect is way more likely when government restricts privacy rights.
The Kugler and Strahilevitz result does not disparage that modified version of
the theory. 29 Finally, the authors studied a decision from the Supreme Court, not
the President or some other organ of government whose actions might garner
more, and longer-lasting, attention. Nonetheless, we have some reason to doubt
that Katz circularity is a real phenomenon.
The second reason not to worry about Katz circularity is that, if it happened,
there are doctrinal tools to deal with it. First, when Katz circularity was first
contemplated by the Supreme Court, the Court explicitly said that, if circularity
ever obtained, it would ignore Step One of the Katz test. 30 Second, the Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence already has another place where it effectively
deals with another sort of circularity, namely police-created exigent
circumstances. This will take a little time to unpack. Under the exigent
circumstances doctrine, police are allowed to perform suspicionless searches
when certain kinds of emergencies arise. 31 The exigent circumstances doctrine
stands as an exception to both the warrant requirement and the probable cause
requirement. The Court, however, recognized that police conduct can create the
very emergencies that, in turn, justify these exceptions to warrants and probable
cause. This is then a kind of circularity. In response to this possibility, the Court
held in Kentucky v. King that police may not conduct a suspicion-less search
when they create the emergency in an improper manner. 32 In other words, when
police create exigencies by improper means, the courts will behave as if there
26. Id. at 1776.
27. Id. at 1799.
28. To be clear, Kugler and Strahilevitz were testing the presence of societal attitudinal
circularity, not individual attitudinal circularity. Still, if there is no society-wide effect, it is hard to
imagine how there could be a discernible individual effect.
29. Of course, Kugler and Strahilevitz would be free to suggest this modification is totally ad
hoc.
30. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979).
31. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984).
32. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462 (2011).
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was no exigency at all. Similarly, the Court could say about Katz circularity that
if the government improperly brings about diminished expectations of privacy,
the courts will behave as though the person did not have diminished expectations
of privacy.
III. RESTRICTING PRIVACY WITHOUT GOVERNMENT HELP
The previous part offered some reasons why Katz circularity may not be so
worrisome. Empirical evidence suggests that government will not be able to
affect our expectations very much. Also, courts have devised means of dealing
with circularity, if it should arise. This part urges more expansive reflection on
the problem that Katz circularity poses. The problem is bigger than government.
All manner of things might improperly reduce someone’s subjective
expectations of privacy.
Some commentators have already raised the issue that various private parties
may actively seek to reduce our expectations of privacy. When an employer
informs employees that it will monitor their emails and calls made with
company-provided electronics, the employees may come to expect less privacy
with respect to their electronic communications. 33 When a website announces
that it will track all users’ online activity, the users may come to expect less
privacy in their web browsing. 34 Some tech companies even monitor one’s
offline activity, if one relies on geospatial location services, like Google Maps. 35
In that case, individuals, who must rely on such technology to navigate the
modern world (literally), may come to expect less privacy with respect to their
comings and goings. If expectations do diminish, government could capitalize
on this. 36 In a slogan, we don’t have to worry about Big Brother when we have
Google.
Above, I offered two reasons to assuage fears about government diminishing
our expectations of privacy. One reason was that social science suggests that
government cannot diminish our expectations very much, and the other reason

33. See Marissa A. Lalli, Spicy Little Conversations: Technology in the Workplace and A Call
for A New Cross-Doctrinal Jurisprudence, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 253 (2011).
34. Lan Hang & James Chadwick, Internet Privacy: A Tale of Two Cookies, 33 BRIEF 48, 49–
50 (2004).
35. Todd Haselton, Google Maps Keeps a Detailed Record of Everywhere You Go—Here’s
How to Stop it, CNBC (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/16/how-to-stop-googlemaps-from-tracking-and-saving-your-location.html [https://perma.cc/2MVT-88QY].
36. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). Currently, government must rely on Step
Two of Katz to get any of the aforementioned information without Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
Essentially, the government must argue that it is not reasonable for individuals to expect privacy in
whatever they turn over to third-parties, a doctrine that many members of the Court increasingly
find unpalatable. In a world where private parties warp individuals’ subjective expectations, the
third-party doctrine need not to be invoked. If people no longer expect privacy, there is no need to
reach Katz Step Two.
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was that courts have ways of dealing with governments that try to diminish
expectations of privacy. Those reasons are unavailable when we face private
entities that could potentially diminish our expectations of privacy. First, there
is no private entity analogue of the Kugler and Strahilevitz paper, so we do not
know whether people’s expectations of privacy are moved by the behavior of
private entities. Second, if private entities can distort our expectations of privacy,
courts have no obvious doctrinal tricks to counteract that.
So far, I have argued that the heart of the worry about Katz circularity is
really a worry about someone—whether government or a private entity—
improperly reducing individuals’ subjective expectations of privacy with the
consequence that the individuals will, in turn, get less Fourth Amendment
protection. In the last bit of this part, I suggest ways that an individual might
come to expect little privacy where this result has nothing to do with government
or private entities trying to reduce anyone’s privacy.
Consider the following hypotheticals:
Paranoia
Alex has paranoid personality disorder. Alex believes without evidence that the
government is spying on him at his home. He tells this to anyone who will listen.
Alex, therefore, has no subjective expectations of privacy in what he says at
home. In fact, Alex, under the delusion that police are listening to every word
he says, likes making up stories to send police on wild goose chases. On one
occasion, Alex makes up a story about killing a young person in a remote patch
of forest, burying them, and leaving a distinctive wound on the victim’s
forehead. Unbeknownst to Alex, a young person really was killed in just that
way, and the police really are spying on him! Alex is then arrested for the
murder, and when Alex moves to exclude evidence of what he has said, the court
rules that he had no subjective expectations of privacy.
Gullibility
Bethany has recently watched a movie with her friend Callie. The movie, though
fictional, employs all the tired tropes of found footage films, and it claims that
the government is watching everyone’s every move. Callie, merely to get a
laugh, tells Bethany that the movie’s claims are all true. Bethany, who is
exceedingly gullible, believes her friend. Bethany posts all over her social media
what she has just ‘learned.’ Callie, who is too cool for social media, never sees
this and has no opportunity to correct the mistake. Some of Bethany’s posts go
viral, and members of local police see them. Though she has done nothing to
occasion criminal suspicion, police may now surveil Bethany with no Fourth
Amendment scrutiny because she has no subjective expectations of privacy.
Dislocation 37
Darnell has been smuggled out of his home country, which is effectively run by
a mafia. The official government which proclaims the standard list of liberal
37. This modifies a hypothetical case from Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979).
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freedom is very weak. In Darnell’s homeland, he has no expectations of privacy
with respect to any aspect of his life. The mafia controls just about everything.
Darnell’s country is very poor, and its citizens know very little about other
countries and their mores. As a result, Darnell, who is now in the United States,
does not know that, in his new country, he enjoys protection against
unreasonable searches of say, his backpack. In fact, Darnell suspects that the
new country is no different than the old and suspects that powerful people,
including police officers, could rifle through his backpack at any time. Because
of his suspicions, arguably, nothing that happens to Darnell can be a Fourth
Amendment search.

These examples are admittedly farfetched, but the point each makes is very
real. 38 Our expectations can be shaped by things aside from the government or
private entities trying to reduce those expectations. People may develop
diminished expectations of privacy due to mental illness or misapprehending
certain facts about the world. In those cases, it seems unfair for courts to hold
that the individuals, for some very unfortunate reason, have no right against
unreasonable searches.
Even without misapprehension or unfortunate circumstance, some people
might have diminished expectations of privacy. Consider the case of small
children. If we can accurately discern their beliefs, it would not be surprising to
learn that they have limited expectations of privacy. There will certainly be a
point at which the very young do not understand the concept of privacy; a
fortiori, they do not expect privacy at that point. Even after gaining a
rudimentary understanding of privacy, many children only have a modicum of
privacy. In a good home, they are constantly monitored by others. Reasonably
then, children will have little expectation of privacy. Yet, it seems strange to
think that children have severely reduced or no Fourth Amendment rights,
especially since children can and do get tried for crimes. 39
38. Though not much more farfetched than the early examples scholars have used to motivate
Katz circularity.
39. Jon Burstein, Teen Sentenced to 28 Years in Prison, CHI. TRIB. (July 28, 2001),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/sns-brazill-story.html [https://perma.cc/2PCH-K99U] (reporting
a 28-year sentence imposed upon a 14-year-old for murder); Stephanie Chen, Boy, 12, Faces Grown
Up Murder Charges, CNN (Mar. 15, 2010), https://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/02/10/pennsylva
nia.young.murder.defendant/?hpt=C1 [https://perma.cc/9GLE-DHSQ] (reporting a possible life
sentence for an 11-year-old); Lindsey Bever, It Took 10 Minutes to Convict 14-year-old George
Stinney Jr. It Took 70 years After His Execution to Exonerate Him., WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/12/18/the-rush-job-conviction-of14-year-old-george-stinney-exonerated-70-years-after-execution/ [https://perma.cc/984K-779N]
(reflecting on the execution of a later-exonerated 14-year-old for murder); Eileen Kelley, Judge
Decides Life Sentence is Warranted for Joshua Phillips in Maddie Clifton’s Shocking Death, THE
FLA. TIMES-UNION (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.jacksonville.com/news/public-safety/2017-1117/judge-decides-life-sentence-warranted-joshua-phillips-maddie-clifton-s
[https://perma.cc/Y
3CC-Q6U6] (reporting the reinstatement of a sentence to life imprison for a murder committed at
age 14); Aimee Green, Thurston Shooter Kip Kinkel’s 112-year Prison Term is Constitutional,

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

818

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:809

IV. THE NORMATIVE IRRELEVANCE OF SUBJECTIVE EXPECTATIONS
Thus far, this essay has offered a variety of ways, beyond government
misdeeds, that an individual might find her subjective expectations of privacy
improperly reduced. In these cases, it would be unfair for courts to allow
government to capitalize on these improper reductions and, accordingly, to
afford the individual no protection against unreasonable searches. It might seem
that the essay is stumping for a Katz Step Zero, where a court would ask whether
the individual’s expectations, whatever they are, were formed in an improper
way. Such a test, presumably, would instruct courts to ignore the actual
expectations if they were improperly reduced. In this final part of the essay, I
explain why the better approach is just to fully jettison any concern with
subjective expectations of privacy in the first place.
To show why all we need is Step Two, I rely on a simple deductive
argument. 40 In the universe of cases where Step One is outcome-determinative, 41
Step One can either return plausible results (i.e., results we can accept about
whether someone should get Fourth Amendment protection) or implausible
results (e.g., Katz circularity cases or some of the other cases from above). If
Step One returns plausible results, one could arrive at those same results with
Step Two. If Step One returns implausible results, one could correct the problem
either with a Step Zero or just Step Two. The conclusion is that, in all cases,
Step Two is sufficient.
When does Step One return plausible results? When teaching Katz to
students, I often try to make Step One intuitive by offering an example like the
following.
Public Pipe
Suppose that a man is walking down the public sidewalk at midday, openly
smoking his crackpipe. The man, fully in public, has no expectations that his
behavior is private. He just does not care because he is so high. Should police
have to get a warrant in order to use the evidence of the man publicly smoking?

The example is meant to convince students of Justice Harlan’s point that
when someone has no subjective expectation of privacy in their activity, it seems

High Court Rules, THE OREGONIAN (May 10, 2018), https://www.oregonlive.com/pacificnorthwest-news/2018/05/school_shooter_kip_kinkels_112.html [https://perma.cc/C8MU-PRKV]
(reporting that the court upheld the 112-year sentence imposed on a 15-year-old).
40. To be precise, it is a disjunctive elimination argument, the underlying structure of which
is the following:
1. A or B
2. If A, then C
3. If B, then C
4. Therefore, C.
41. Step One is outcome-determinative only when someone fails Step One.
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odd to afford the activity Fourth Amendment protection. While the example
serves my purpose of getting students to see why anybody would think they care
about subjective expectations of privacy, the example is actually misleading.
The real reason why the crackpipe guy’s behavior should get no Fourth
Amendment protection is that it would be unreasonable to expect privacy in such
circumstances. In other words, one can get to the right result just by employing
Step Two of Katz.
To vindicate Harlan’s point, one would need an example in which (a) it
seems reasonable to expect privacy, (b) the person lacks the expectation, and (c)
it still seems like the person deserves no Fourth Amendment protection. Nothing
checks all three boxes. All cases that satisfy (a) and (b) are instances of Katz
circularity or other improper reductions of the individual’s expectations, and
therefore cannot satisfy (c). Another way to see the point, nothing can satisfy (a)
and (c). If it seems reasonable to expect privacy in a situation, it will not seem
like the situation deserves no Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
Rumination on Public Pipe shows that Step Two of Katz can get the same
result as Step One anytime Step One returns a plausible result.
What about the cases in which Step One returns an implausible result?
Implausible results happen in Katz circularity cases and other cases when a
person’s expectations have been improperly reduced. To deal with those
potentialities, either a court could begin with an inquiry about whether the
expectations were improperly reduced (a Step Zero strategy) or the court could
just ask whether it would be reasonable to expect privacy in a given situation (a
Step Two strategy). These amount to the same thing, and one can see that by
revisiting a hypothetical case from above.
In Paranoia, Alex does not expect privacy at home because of his mental
illness. A court could devise a rule providing that, where lowered expectations
of privacy stem from mental illness, the court will impute to the suspect the
relevant higher expectations of privacy. Such a rule would enable the court to
provide folks like Alex with some protection against unreasonable searches.
However, this purpose would just as easily be served by a court finding that it is
reasonable to expect privacy in one’s home, without any inquiry into what Alex
expects and why he expects it.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Nearly a half century ago, one commentator boldly proclaimed, “[a]n actual,
subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in . . . a theory of what
the [F]ourth [A]mendment protects. It can neither add to, nor can its absence
detract from, an individual’s claim to fourth amendment protection.” 42 This
essay has tried to supply further support for an idea that truly should be obvious.

42. Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 384.
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I have argued that the two-step Katz test should be refashioned into a single
step test, asking only whether the government action intrudes upon something a
person would reasonably regard as private. In this way, I have added to an
argument offered by Orin Kerr. Professor Kerr has claimed that, as a matter of
fact, a suspect’s subjective expectations of privacy are irrelevant to judges. 43
Judges simply pay no attention to these details, despite the explicit exhortation
by the Katz test that judges pay close attention to subjective expectations of
privacy. If my essay is successful, it offers a compelling apologia for judicial
behavior.
Some readers, after reading along to this point, may find themselves unable
to accept my proposal because I have not offered a detailed picture about how
Katz Step Two should ideally operate. A full answer is beyond the scope of this
project because this project is supposed to be neutral with respect to the proper
gloss on Step Two of Katz. One can plug in one’s preferred theory about when
expecting privacy would be reasonable. My claim here is just that the best theory
of Step Two—whatever it is—should govern whether a Fourth Amendment
search has occurred.
Of course, there is one asterisk. To explain this asterisk, it may help to
review another argument from Orin Kerr. In his article, Four Models of Fourth
Amendment Protection, Kerr articulates four models that the Supreme Court
employs to decide whether something gets Fourth Amendment protection. 44 The
four models are the probabilistic model (how likely are others to have found
this), 45 the private facts model (whether particularly private facts are revealed), 46
the positive law model (whether property law or other law creates expectations
of privacy), 47 and the policy model (just whether it would be good to give the
relevant thing Fourth Amendment protection). 48 Kerr argues that the Court
rightly mixes all four models, 49 but this interpretive claim is irrelevant for our
purposes. I am most interested in the fact that Kerr distills four coherent models
of the content of Step Two. Each of these is fine, and I happen to think, along
with Kerr, that some admixture of approaches is soundest. Kerr leaves out a fifth
possible approach, a purely sociological approach. On such an approach, we
would gloss Step Two as protecting just what people—individually or
collectively—currently expect to be private. This understanding is obviously
deficient because of Katz circularity. That then is my asterisk: my essay’s
proposal is neutral about the proper gloss of Katz Step Two, except insofar as it
bars a purely sociological approach to the content of Katz Step Two. A
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Kerr, supra note 3, at 122.
Kerr, supra note 16, at 506.
Id. at 508–12.
Id. at 512–15.
Id. at 516–19.
Id. at 519–22.
Kerr, supra note 16, at 525.
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sociological approach would fail because, as this paper has maintained, with
respect to the Fourth Amendment and its protections, subjective expectations of
privacy are normatively irrelevant.
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